Ukraine's FM: Russia to spend record 180 billion euros on military in 2027 — time for frozen assets

Full text

Andrii Sybiha is Ukraine’s minister of foreign affairs

Europe can no longer remain immobilized on Russian assets. Now is the time to use them for Ukraine’s defense and recovery.

This decision, which is long overdue, would be a game changer that could shift the balance in Ukraine’s favor — particularly if taken alongside strong sanctions pressure. But to achieve this, we have to be faster and more decisive than Russia.

According to the latest reports, Russia plans to spend a record €180 billion on its military in 2027 — more than 40% above its 2026 defense allocation. And that is only part of the picture. The country’s draft federal budget allocates a combined €669 billion to defense and security for the 2027–2029 period.

These figures make clear Russia wants war. Moscow is increasing the pressure, intensifying its terror against Ukrainian civilians and raising the cost of defense for both Ukraine and Europe. But as the cost of war grows, it should grow faster for the aggressor.

The higher the price for Moscow, the sooner peace will be restored. Half-hearted pressure on Russia and half-measures in support of Ukraine will only prolong conflict and increase the overall price tag. Decisive steps can bring it to a close.

Local residents stand amid the rubble of a five-storey residential building following a Russian attack that killed seven people, including three children, in Zaporizhzhia on October 10, 2026. | Daria Nazarova/AFP via Getty Images

At the end of August, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland addressed the European Commission, urging renewed discussion on the full use of immobilized Russian assets. We are grateful to them. But it is now time to turn this discussion into a legal process: launch a permanent platform, engage experts and develop the decision.

Europe has taken the hardest step already. In 2022, the G7 immobilized some €300 billion in Russian central bank reserves, roughly €210 billion of them in the EU. In 2024, the G7 borrowed $50 billion for Ukraine against the future windfall profits on those reserves. And in December 2025, the bloc made the immobilization open-ended.

What remains undecided is the only step that matters: using the assets themselves.

Every argument for and against this has been heard, and the debate now revolves around its scope and how to mitigate associated risks.

The prevailing view is that the decision to use these assets must not expose any single country to disproportionate risk — above all Belgium, where most of the assets sit at Euroclear. We agree. To that end, Ukraine’s Finance Ministry proposed a clear plan to the European Commission: placing the assets under collective EU control, so that the decision to use them — and the liability for doing so — is European, not Belgian.

An outside view of the headquarters of the Euroclear Group financial institute in Brussels, April 9, 2025. | Nicolas Maeterlinck/Belga Mag/AFP via Getty Images

Belgium’s exposure is a reason to share the risk, not to do nothing.

Another common argument is that any decision must cover immobilized assets in every jurisdiction, not only those at Euroclear. Again, we agree — with one caveat: This can be done but on parallel tracks. Europe should not make its own decision contingent on protracted global coordination when its security is in peril.

Skeptics raise four objections of principle against the full use of these assets: that using them breaks the rule of law, that it undermines the euro as a reserve currency, that it gives away leverage in peace talks, and that Russia would retaliate by seizing Western assets.

Let’s take these arguments in turn.

On rule of law: Under the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility, a state that commits an internationally wrongful act owes full reparations, and injured states may take countermeasures to induce compliance. And in November 2022, the U.N. General Assembly recognized that Russia must bear the legal consequences of its aggression, including reparations.

The same articles also require countermeasures to be reversible, and Ukraine’s position honors that: The legal title stays in an EU-governed vehicle, Ukraine receives financing rather than ownership, and the arrangement unwinds the day Russia pays what it owes.

On the euro: This has already been tested. When the reserves were immobilized in February 2022, the euro’s share of global reserves did not move. Reserve holders understood then what they understand now — that this principle applies to a state waging a war of aggression in breach of the U.N. Charter, not to anyone else. Moreover, the euro’s credibility as a reserve currency rests on Europe’s ability to defend order and principles.

Members of the General Assembly vote on a draft resolution during a special session in the General Assembly Hall at United Nations Headquarters on November 14, 2022 in New York City. | Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images

On leverage: These assets have been immobilized for more than four years and have not moved Moscow any closer to peace. A country budgeting €669 billion for a war of aggression is not bargaining for its reserves. What deters Russia is Ukraine’s capacity to keep fighting — and that is precisely what a European solution on these assets would fund. The leverage is not in holding the money, it is in spending it.

Finally, on seizing Western assets in Russia: Putin has been doing this since 2022. This September alone, Moscow took control of the Russian businesses of Nestlé, Auchan, Leroy Merlin, FM Logistic and Metro, following Danone and Carlsberg. That is why, as early as March 2022, we urged companies to leave. The confiscation of European property has already happened — and keeping the assets immobilized did not deter this.

Let us be clear about what we are not proposing. We are not proposing outright confiscation — the legal title will not transfer. We are not proposing a Belgian decision — the risk will be shared at the EU level. And we are not proposing a precedent for anyone else. The conditions — a war of aggression condemned by the U.N. General Assembly — are met by only one state.

Russia must be the one to pay for the damage it has caused and continues to cause, not European taxpayers.

We should be sending the right signal to Moscow: That it will not outlast our resolve.

We should be sending the right signal to skeptical audiences across Europe ahead of a major election year: That the rising cost of Ukraine’s defense will be covered at the expense of Russia.

Last but not least, we should be sending the right signal to the Ukrainian people: that they are not alone in confronting the aggressor.

The full use of Russian assets would bring tangible and immediate results, strengthening Ukraine on the frontline and bringing peace closer. After four years, Europe should no longer be immobilized on major decisions. It needs political will, collective commitment and a solid legal formula.

We urge EU leaders to make this vital decision without delay. And we look forward to the European bravery in taking this critical step.

POLITICO occasionally publishes opinion pieces from guest authors to offer our readers a range of perspectives on the intersection of power and politics. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of POLITICO.