Biggest-ever PiS split: what does it mean for Poland's right and Tusk's government?

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Notes from Poland is run by a small editorial team and is published by an independent, non-profit foundation that is funded through donations from our readers. We cannot do what we do without your support.

By Aleks Szczerbiak

The biggest-ever split within Poland’s main right-wing opposition party is a serious self-inflicted wound, signalling a more fragmented conservative landscape and complicating the right’s path back to power. While it provides a tactical boost for the Tusk government, there is still every chance of a conservative comeback if the right-wing parties cooperate effectively.

Radical-right challengers

At the end of last month, the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, Poland’s ruling party between 2015 and 2023 and currently the main opposition grouping, saw the biggest split in its 25-year history. The rupture was the culmination of months of increasingly open and bitter factional conflict over the party’s future direction.

PiS has for the last two decades been the dominant force on the Polish right. However, it lost power following the October 2023 parliamentary election, which led to the formation of a coalition headed up by Donald Tusk, leader of the liberal-centrist Civic Coalition (KO) party.

Since last autumn, PiS has seen its polling numbers decline to the party’s lowest level of support for 15 years. At the same time, it has been challenged by two radical right competitors: the free-market Confederation (Konfederacja) and the ultra-nationalist Confederation of the Polish Crown (KKP), which together began to match, or even exceed, PiS’s level of support.

Responding to declining support

At the heart of this conflict was a bitter clash between longtime party leader Jarosław Kaczyński and Mateusz Morawiecki, who served as PiS prime minister from 2017 to 2023 but grew increasingly impatient with the former’s dominance.

Two main factions emerged centred on a bitter dispute on how the party should respond to declining support and political competition on its right flank.

The hardline traditionalist-conservative faction, often referred to as the “butter-makers” ( maślarze ), was more Eurosceptic and advocated a clearer right-wing agenda that included pushing ahead with radical state reconstruction and promoting a conservative vision of national identity and traditional values.

In their reading, PiS lost support to its right-wing competitors because it was not radical enough and the solution was to sharpen its ideological profile and double down on hardline rhetoric.

The split in PiS is a blow to the party and its leader, Jarosław Kaczyński.

But the potential emergence of a new centre-right party led by Mateusz Morawiecki could actually help the opposition win a majority at next year's elections, writes @danieltilles1 https://t.co/xMP7e4rOFf

— Notes from Poland 🇵🇱 (@notesfrompoland) July 31, 2026

This group gained influence in party structures and when, in March, Kaczyński designated one of its key figures, former education minister Przemysław Czarnek, as the party’s prime ministerial candidate in the next parliamentary election, scheduled for autumn 2027, this was widely seen as a clear signal favouring the traditionalist-conservative faction.

Morawiecki and his allies in the modernising-technocratic faction, often called the “scouts” ( harcerze ), also had strong conservative values and at times were very critical of Poland’s post-1989 establishment.

However, they advocated a strategy of stressing economic competence, pragmatic governance and boosting Polish prosperity over hardline rhetoric on moral-cultural issues as a more effective way of appealing to voters less influenced by traditional institutions such as the Catholic church.

Although they were also critical of Brussels overreach, Morawiecki’s faction preferred to avoid escalating conflict with the EU and argued that PiS had to broaden its appeal to younger, urban, more centrist-conservative Poles who found radical cultural rhetoric off-putting.

Programmatic differences and personal ambitions

The conflict became so destabilising because, although rooted in genuine programmatic and strategic disagreements, personalities and individual ambitions also played a major role.

While Kaczyński maintained formal control of the party, his advancing age escalated debates over PiS’s direction and leadership, and these tensions intensified after the party failed to translate its presidential candidate Karol Nawrocki’s surprise summer 2025 election victory into broader momentum.

For his part, Morawiecki grew increasingly impatient and frustrated as hardliners sidelined him, while his supporters were afraid that they would be excluded from PiS candidate lists at the next election.

These long-simmering tensions came to a head in April, when Morawiecki announced the formation of Development Plus (Rozwój Plus), a think tank-like platform focused on economic development

The association was widely interpreted by Kaczyński and PiS hardliners as a direct challenge to party unity and the leader’s authority. The leadership ruled that Development Plus violated the PiS statute, which explicitly prohibits members from joining political organisations that conflict with the party’s goals.

While Morawiecki insisted that it was simply a modest intra-party policy forum, by registering an organisation with dozens of parliamentarians, he gave his faction a formal institutional shell that could potentially act as a launchpad for his own rival breakaway party.

Initially, Kaczyński and Morawiecki came to a compromise agreement whereby Development Plus would work within an official party expert group.

However, in July the situation escalated when the PiS leadership issued an ultimatum banning members from participating in internal political factions (clearly targeting Development Plus) and instructing parliamentarians to sign loyalty declarations confirming that they were not involved in any such groupings.

Most complied, but 40 parliamentarians affiliated with Development Plus refused to do so, accusing the leadership of political blackmail. Ultimately, Kaczyński announced that, by refusing to sign, Morawiecki and his allies had effectively left the party, while Development Plus framed it as expulsion over policy differences caused by “plotters” surrounding the party leader.

Mateusz Morawiecki has confirmed that his Development Plus group, which is splitting from the national-conservative opposition PiS party, will soon form a party of its own.

However, he categorically ruled out ever working with Prime Minister @donaldtusk https://t.co/J6mQaer4MA

— Notes from Poland 🇵🇱 (@notesfrompoland) August 4, 2026

An even more fragmented right

The loss of 40 deputies means that PiS is no longer the largest parliamentary caucus, thus losing procedural advantages, committee control and visibility. The departing group includes many experienced and talented politicians, particularly in the economic and foreign policy fields.

The split also reduces PiS’s funding, staffing, and in some regions local organisation, as well as creating the risk of demoralisation and further defections. Even if the Polish right secures a parliamentary majority at the next election, PiS’s relative influence could be greatly reduced.

Although Kaczyński’s formal party leadership remains unquestioned, the split signals to the broader right that his authority is waning and undermines his claim to be the undisputed hegemon and central broker on the right; he is increasingly now one leader among several.

It also further erodes the model that Kaczyński has built over many years as the main ideologue and ultimate arbiter of internal PiS factions. In earlier crises, this personal authority and control gave him leverage to keep everyone on board so that disagreements were managed internally, and even disillusioned figures usually stayed in, or returned to, the party.

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Indeed, by adding a fourth distinctive player, the PiS split further compounds the divisions on the Polish right that have deepened since the last election, transforming what was once a relatively consolidated “big tent” bloc into a multi-polar competitive field.

For sure, polls conducted after the split show the combined right-wing vote as competitive overall, but even if this level of support remains stable, or even increases slightly, it is now divided across more options.

This is significant because Poland’s proportional electoral system uses the d’Hondt counting system that favours larger groupings. It also creates the risk that smaller right-wing parties such as Morawiecki’s new grouping could fall below the 5% parliamentary representation threshold, so their votes are excluded from seat allocation.

All of this makes it harder for the right to translate raw voter support into political power.

Moreover, even if the right-wing parties win a combined parliamentary majority, post-election coordination becomes much more complex with four (or more) actors whose leaders’ rivalries, different priorities and historical animosities complicate forming a stable coalition government.

Nawrocki’s role will be crucial

In the light of this, Nawrocki has emerged as a critical unifier with crossover appeal across the fractured Polish right. His presidential election victory showed that he could attract support well beyond traditional PiS loyalists and consolidate a broad right-wing coalition, including the vast majority of voters from both Confederations.

As president, he operates outside direct party control and has cultivated an image as an authoritative unifying figure on the right, which gives him much greater moral and symbolic stature than a partisan leader immersed in day-to-day machinations.

Nawrocki has also used his constitutional powers and standing, including a legislative veto that the government lacks the three-fifths parliamentary majority to overturn, to position himself assertively as a powerful counterweight to the Tusk administration, and is currently Poland’s most popular politician.

Nonetheless, Nawrocki’s potential to act as a possible right-wing unifier and broker is limited. For sure, he can use the presidency to set a broad conservative agenda and mediate negotiations among the various right-wing groupings to secure pre- and post-election agreements.

Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of Poland's largest opposition party, PiS, has called on President @NawrockiKn to help unify the country’s various right-wing opposition forces ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections https://t.co/Q3BFSOSfTG

— Notes from Poland 🇵🇱 (@notesfrompoland) August 10, 2026

However, Nawrocki has no formal unifying mandate and his success ultimately depends on whether the various actors are willing to be led. Without broader cooperation, even his efforts will only mitigate, not eliminate, the damage from a divided right, and personal and ideological rivalries currently run deep and cannot be easily overridden.

Moreover, not only is the president expected to remain formally above the fray and not engage too openly in day-to-day politics, he also lacks the control over party organisational machinery needed to micro-manage and enforce messy backroom deals.

Pivotal but not transformative?

Initial polling conducted since the split suggests that Morawiecki’s new grouping would likely clear the 5% threshold and enter parliament with a small-to-medium-sized fraction; according to Politico Europe, it is currently averaging around 6% support.

Although this could make it a pivotal player in coalition talks, it does not suggest that the grouping can dramatically reshape the country’s political landscape. Moreover, its support appears to be drawn mainly from PiS’s traditional electoral base, so it is simply further fragmenting the existing right-wing vote rather than drawing in a significant number of new voters who hitherto supported the governing coalition parties.

Thirty-day polling averages for Poland’s main political groups, including Development Plus (R+) (source: eWybory.eu)

For sure, Morawiecki‘s project has advantages that many newcomers lack, notably its leader’s very high name recognition and a sizeable bloc of high-profile, political heavyweight allies, much larger than any previous PiS breakaway faction. His grouping immediately became the third largest parliamentary fraction, giving it visibility, funding, and organisational backbone.

However, although there are some rare exceptions that usually involve major figures with significant resources breaking from established parties, it is a familiar pattern in post-1989 Polish politics for a brand new “startup” party to show an early bounce, benefiting from initial media coverage, only to fade or disappear as voters drift back to more established groupings or abstain at the next election.

Sustaining momentum requires local organisational infrastructure, reliable funding, rapid professionalisation, and a clear identity, which new parties often lack. Indeed, to be successful a new startup should really attract at least 10% support initially simply because of its “newness”.

Over the years, PiS breakaway politicians have established new parties that either quickly disappeared from the political scene or were eventually reintegrated into the grouping.

Temporary relief for Tusk

From a short-term tactical perspective, the PiS split is a welcome political gift for the Tusk government, shifting the media focus away from criticisms of its record and recent scandals and controversies.

It has for example, blunted the opposition’s ability to maintain a sustained assault over a scandal involving high earnings for, and mismanagement by, a KO-connected doctor, alleged VIP access and potential patient harm at the Warsaw South Hospital, which had previously dominated the summer news headlines.

The ruling coalition is likely to survive until next year's election, but its prospects are hampered by a weak domestic record, writes @AleksSzczerbiak

The government has therefore made security key to its reelection narrative, but that also carries risks https://t.co/w2UeNaTwAO

— Notes from Poland 🇵🇱 (@notesfrompoland) June 1, 2026

However, the PiS split has not resolved the deeper image and performance problems that have dragged down the Tusk government’s approval ratings. The administration struggles with perceptions of slow delivery on promises while facing a hostile president, and if these problems persist, or new controversies reignite strongly once the PiS drama cools, the government will very quickly find itself back on the defensive.

The PiS split only provides temporary relief; to win the next election, the ruling coalition needs to improve its own standing, not rely on opposition mistakes.

Notes from Poland is run by a small editorial team and published by an independent, non-profit foundation that is funded through donations from our readers. We cannot do what we do without your support.

Main image credit:

Aleks Szczerbiak is Professor of Politics at the University of Sussex. The original version of this article appeared here .

Main image credit: Krystian Maj/KPRM